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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of monetary policy and inflation dynamics in the wake of an oil price shock have motivated a large body of research, including Hamilton (1996) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) , Leduc and Sill (2004) , and Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) . However, less attention has been paid to the origins of oil price changes, for example, Kilian, Rebucci, and Spatafora (2007) , Hamilton (2008) and Kilian (2008b) . More prominently, Kilian (2009) argues that there are three main sources of oil price shocks that lead to oil price fluctuations: oil supply shocks; world aggregate demand shocks, and the shifts in the precautionary demand for oil due to uncertainties about future oil supply.
Our paper contributes to the literature by showing the impacts of oil price movements caused by various sources. We develop a sticky-price DSGE model through which we analyze the effects of various shocks studied in Kilian (2009) , namely, the increase in aggregate demand, unexpected oil supply disruption and the precautionary oil demand on an (oil importing) small open economy (SOE) and on the rest of the world (ROW). In particular, we assume that the world economy is composed of a domestic SOE and a continuum of other small open economies. Effectively, an SOE has a negligible effect on the world economy. Hence, the ROW is regarded as a closed economy and oil demand and price are determined in the ROW. Oil supply is assumed to follow an exogenous process. 2 We show that, although both productivity and fiscal policy shocks can be regarded as "demand" shocks for the oil market, leading to a rise in the world aggregate demand and a subsequent surge in the real price of oil, their impacts on inflation are different. In the case of a productivity increase, the marginal cost of the firms decline, which leads to lower CPI inflation. On the other hand, an increase in government spending directly creates additional demand for the consumption goods, while putting upward pressure on the marginal cost of the firms and the aggregate price level. We also compare the effects of expected and unexpected oil supply shocks. In the case of an expected future oil supply shortage, a precautionary oil demand raises the current real price of oil. Our results suggest that distinguishing between the causes of oil price shocks is very important, if not crucial, in both identifying the impact of oil price shocks on key macroeconomic variables and determining the appropriate policy responses to deal with them.
There are a few features of our model that are worth emphasizing. First, we incorporate oil demand in a relatively simple manner as in Blanchard and Gali (2008) , while it is this simplicity that allows us to get analytical insights into both the causes and the international transmission mechanism of the oil price shocks. Contrary to their analysis, however, oil price is endogenously determined in our model. Since oil is included in the production function, oil demand and supply shocks in the ROW create oil price fluctuations. Given that oil price changes are not resilient to the global macroeconomic developments, it is more appropriate that oil prices are determined inside the model. Second, we model the SOE and the ROW together, so that we are able to analyze the impacts of these shocks both in an SOE and a closed economy. In the SOE framework, ROW is traditionally modelled by a few exogenous processes, ignoring possible (and important) channels through which shocks affecting the ROW are transmitted to the SOE. 3 Although it is implicitly assumed in the existing literature that the effects of an oil shock can be analyzed by the introduction of an exogenous oil price process, this method is misleading as it does not consider the causes or effects of oil price changes, which eventually affects the SOE through real exchange rate and trade channels. Our results confirm the contribution of this detailed modelling exercise as each shock considered in the paper influences the real price of oil and the economies differently and has specific transmission channels. Third, our model reveals that a precautionary oil demand shock is likely to cause sharp fluctuations in the price of oil. If there is an expectation of lower future oil supply, the current spot prices will adjust immediately, causing expectations-linked oil price volatility in the world oil market.
Recently, the rapid increases in the world oil prices have stimulated a renewed interest on the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. The fact that the oil price increases started in the early 2000s have led to very different outcomes than the 1970s in particular has received much attention. Nordhaus (2007) and Segal (2007) propose that the main reason for a smaller impact of oil shocks is the change in the transmission mechanism which helps to impede oil prices feed through to core inflation, and therefore enables a less aggressive monetary policy. Blanchard and Gali (2008) suggest that more flexible labor markets, more credible and stronger anti-inflationary stance of monetary policies and declining oil intensities in the major economies have helped to curb the effects of higher oil prices.
As Woodford (2007) argues, however, these explanations are not convincing enough as they ignore the endogenous responses of the real price of oil to the global economic conditions. In this line of thought, Elekdag and Laxton (2007) and Kilian (2008a Kilian ( , 2008b argue that one of the reasons for the oil price increases of the 2000s is the increased world aggregate demand, possibly due to the world productivity increases, contrary to the oil price shocks mainly driven by supply side changes in the 1970s. 4 Relative to this literature, we take a step further by modelling different causes of oil price changes for domestic economy, as well as the world economy with a clear consideration of possible demand and supply side developments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the structure of the model is laid out. The oil market equilibrium and the equilibrium conditions are derived in Section 3. We discuss the findings in Section 4. The conclusions are outlined in Section 5.
II. THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMY MODEL
We develop an open economy sticky price DSGE model with a representative household, producers, a government and a monetary authority. The model shares its basic features with many new Keynesian SOE models, including the benchmark models of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) , although several differences remain. In order to capture oil shocks, we follow Blanchard and Gali (2008) by introducing an oil input in the production function.
Oil market equilibrium is determined in the ROW. In order to highlight our interest on a SOE and its interlinkages with the foreign economy (ROW), variables without superscripts refer to the home economy, while variables with a star indicate the foreign economy variables. Small letters denote percentage deviations of the respective variables from their steady-state levels. We briefly sketch the model and present the log-linearized equations in Table 1 , while the details of the model are provided in the Appendix. 
A. Households
A representative household is infinitely lived and seeks to maximize:
is the period utility function, t N denotes hours of work and t C is a composite of domestically produced goods and imported foreign goods, defined by:
where t H C , and t F C , are CES indices of consumption of domestic and foreign goods, given by:
is an index of the quantity of goods imported from country indicates the expenditure share of the imported goods in the consumption basket of households. We assume that the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods ( 0 >  ) is the same as the degree of substitutability between goods produced in different foreign countries. The household's budget constraint in period t is:
is the consumer price index (CPI) and the price indices for domestically produced and imported goods are:
is a price index for goods imported from country i , Q 1 ,  t t is the stochastic discount factor for the one period ahead nominal payoff, P is the aggregate price index for country i 's consumption goods. We assume that households in the foreign economy face exactly the same optimization problem with identical preferences. Under complete international financial markets assumption and no-arbitrage, Euler equations from both countries can be combined to yield the conventional uncovered interest parity condition.
B. Firms
Each firm produces a differentiated good indexed by 0,1]  j with a production function
is the amount of (imported) oil used in production by firm j , (log) labor . Firm i faces a demand given by:
Assuming that firms take the price of each input as given, cost minimization of the firm implies:
which holds for each firm j . t O P , is the price of oil which is in fact determined endogenously in our model, as will be explored later.  is an employment subsidy designed to allow the flexible price economy to be efficient. The nominal marginal cost is:
5 In the next section, when we analyze the effects of the foreign productivity shocks, we also allow for spillover effects of foreign labor productivity on the SOE. Equation (6) highlights the fact that the cost-minimizing input combination that each firm chooses depends on the relative factor price-that is, labor and oil are substitutes. Hence, higher oil prices brings the substitution of labor for oil, causing an upward adjustment in the real wages. 6 We assume that firms set prices according to Calvo (1983) framework, in which only a randomly selected fraction )
(1   of the firms can adjust their prices optimally. Thus,  is the probability that firm j does not change its price in period t . When setting new price in period t , then, the firm chooses the price ( ) (
where n t TC refers to nominal total cost, subject to (4). Therefore, ) (
should satisfy the following first order condition:
As shown in Woodford (2003) , the firm's optimal price setting strategy implies the following marginal cost-based (log-linearized) Phillips curve:
C. Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary policy reaction function is assumed to be a simple Taylor Rule:
where t  and t x are (log-linearized) consumer price inflation and output gap. 6 We assume here that factor prices are flexible, but our results are robust to the alternative specification where real wages adjust sluggishly. Rigid labor markets, however, trigger second round effects and therefore make it harder to achieve stabilization objective. The results are available upon request.
7 Our analysis ignores possible monetary policy coordination or related strategic interactions between the SOE and the ROW. Considering our assumption that the ROW consists of a continuum of other SOE's, all represented by a unit interval, this assumption is plausible.
We assume that the governments of both the SOE and the ROW are home-biased (i.e.,
). The government spending index can be written as:
The government follows a balanced budget in each period and finances its expenditures by lump-sum taxation:
Expenditure minimization leads to the following government demand function:
We assume a stationary AR(1) process for the government spending ( t G ).
D. Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition in the home goods market requires that the production of domestic goods satisfies:
where,
is country i 's demand for good j produced in the home country. Using the optimal allocation of expenditures for the SOE and the ROW, the real exchange rate definition, the assumption of symmetric preferences and aggregating across goods, we obtain:
III. REST OF THE WORLD AND THE OIL MARKET

A. Equilibrium in the Rest of the World
Apart from being asymmetric in size, SOE and ROW share the same preferences, technology, market structure for the consumption goods sector, and same structures for the monetary and fiscal policies. The price of oil is determined according to the macroeconomic developments in the ROW, which is regarded as a closed economy. In Table 2 , we present the log-linearized equations for the ROW. 
B. Oil Market Equilibrium
We assume that at each point in time there is a world oil endowment (
The process for the (log) oil supply ) ( s t o is defined by a stationary AR (1) process. The market clearing condition in the oil market implies the equalization of the firms' aggregate oil demand in the ROW (
) and the exogenous oil supply. In fact, using the (log-linearized) cost minimization condition for foreign firms, substituting the equilibrium level of employment and then equating the demand for oil to the supply of oil,
can derive the optimum real price of oil (in log-linearized form) in the ROW as follows:
Oil market equilibrium with precautionary oil demand
We analyze the case where an expected decline in the world oil supply induces firms to build up oil reserves. Supposing that the oil shock is temporary and the expectations are for the next period ( 1  t ), the new oil market equilibrium becomes: 8 We assume that the profits from selling oil are distributed evenly among world consumers and are included in the lump-sum transfers in the budget constraints of both the SOE and the ROW. See also Campolmi (2008) . is the amount of reserve build-up in period t . Therefore, the magnitude of the oil reserve build up is the same as the expected future oil supply shortage. The oil reserves as a whole will be used up at the time when the shock is due. Notice that when we allow for the precautionary demand, the effect of the expected future oil supply decrease is observed today. The price of oil is then given by:
A precautionary oil demand will push the oil prices up, and the use up of the oil reserves in the next period will have the opposite effect.
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The dynamics in the next period will depend on whether the shock is actually observed or not.
IV. IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS
Our main objective here is to investigate the channels which transmit the effect of the underlying causes of an oil price increase. We do not aim to match the impulse responses with the ones observed in the empirical literature for two reasons. First, despite the fact that our model is capable reasonably to approximate the behavior of macroeconomic variables of oil-importing small open economies in the wake of an oil price shock, the model dynamics should be enriched to incorporate, at least, habit persistence, wage indexation and financial frictions in order to replicate the historical responses. Neverthless, this may not be as illuminating as it seems at first sight as these additions make it much harder to grasp fully the inner working of the transmission mechanisms and the channels through which the foreign shocks are fed into the home country.
Second, this exercise would require employing some country-specific characteristics; such as whether the country mainly exports/imports raw materials or manufactured products, or whether the monetary authority intervenes in the exchange rate market. In line with our objective, however, we choose to calibrate the model with reasonable values, mostly as they are set in the literature, mainly following the baseline calibration used in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Blanchard and Gali (2008) (see Table 5 ).
Time is measured in quarters. We set 0.99 =  , implying a riskless annual return of approximately 4 percent in the steady state. The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is taken as 1, =  which corresponds to log utility. The inverse of the elasticity of labor supply  is set to 3 since it is assumed that one-third of the time is spent on 9 Expectation shock and therefore the stock build-up last only for one period. At period t , since
is the stock build-up. On the other hand, at period
, that is, the stock is completely depleted.
working. We set the degree of openness ( )  to be 0.4 . The share of labor in the production ) ( is taken as 0.983 , so that the share of oil in the production )
(1   is 1.7 percent.
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The Calvo probability ) ( is assumed to be 0.75 which implies an average period of one year between price adjustments. The elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods (of the same origin)  is 6, implying a flexible price equilibrium mark-up of 
A. Aggregate Demand Shocks
Our aim is to show that aggregate demand increases caused by different shocks affect the economies through different channels. We analyze two different shocks that lead to an increase in the world aggregate demand. In the first case, an unexpected rise of labor productivity is the cause of the surge in aggregate demand. In the second case, however, 10 Blanchard and Gali (2008) set the share of oil in production as 1.7 percent, which corresponds to its value in 1997.
Discount factor
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution aggregate demand in the ROW increases in response to an unexpected rise in government spending.
Labor productivity shock
Responses of selected variables to a 1 percent shock to productivity of labor in the ROW are shown in Appendix Figure 1 . Higher labor productivity creates a higher demand for oil since the increase in oil demand due to positive output growth dominates the decline in oil demand coming from the substitution effect. On the other hand, higher labor productivity implies lower marginal cost of production which spreads to the world as lower import prices. As a result, the increase in output growth is accompanied by low consumer price inflation, but higher oil prices in the global economy.
Following Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) , we look at the effects of the foreign productivity shock on the SOE under two cases: with and without a spillover effect of labor productivity growth.
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Without the spillover effect, a positive labor productivity shock in the ROW leads to a less persistent rise in the output of the SOE. However, with the spillover effect, the rise in the SOE's output is higher and more persistent. The rise in the real oil price is also higher in the SOE when there is a spillover effect due to the lesser appreciation of the SOE's currency. The behavior of CPI, on the other hand, is almost the same with and without spillover effects as the cost-increasing effect of the higher real oil price is offset by the costdecreasing effect of the increase in labor productivity.
This exercise stresses an important point: higher oil prices do not necessarily lead to a conventional higher inflation-lower output scenario; instead, the positive effects of productivity increases on the inflation and output growth may well compensate the negative effects of the higher oil prices.
Government spending shock
Similar to a foreign labor productivity shock, a government spending shock that arises in the ROW increases the world aggregate demand and hence creates an upward adjustment in the price of oil, while it also pushes CPI inflation above the steady-state level as shown in Figure  ( 2). In the ROW, the dynamic responses of output and real price of oil are persistent but smaller in magnitude in the wake of a shock to government spending than their responses under a labor productivity shock. Contrary to the latter, however, CPI inflation and the nominal interest rate increase above their steady-state levels.
After the government spending shock in the ROW, the output of the SOE declines below the steady-state level through two different channels. The first one is the decreased import demand by the ROW. Although a rise in the government spending causes aggregate output to increase, private consumption declines in the ROW. 12 This is due to the decrease in the present value of household's wealth after government increases lump-sum taxes in order to finance its higher spending. The decline in the consumer spending correspondingly reduces the import demand of the ROW, since government spending is assumed to be home-biased and it does not affect import demand accordingly. The second channel works through the real exchange rate. Typically, a government spending shock leads to a real appreciation of the real exchange rate of the country in which the shock is observed. Therefore, the real exchange rate of the SOE depreciates, stimulating the import demand of ROW contrary to the effect of the first channel. All in all, the latter impact outweighs that of the second channel in our case and the output in the SOE declines after the government spending shock in the ROW. CPI inflation of the SOE increases above the steady-state level, since the marginal cost of the firms in the SOE increases due to the real depreciation of the domestic currency.
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Therefore, despite a rise in the foreign labor productivity and in the foreign government spending which can both be regarded as global demand shocks increasing the world aggregate output and the price of oil, their implications for the other macroeconomic dynamics (such as inflation and exchange rate) can be divergent.
B. Oil Supply Shock
In Appendix Figure 3 , we present the dynamic responses in a case where there is a 10 percent decline in the world oil supply which leads to an immediate, almost one-for-one, jump in the world real oil price.
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In that case, output declines and inflation rises in the ROW for two reasons. First, the decline in the oil supply directly reduces world output through production function. Second, the increase in the oil price pushes up the CPI of the ROW above the steady-state level due to the rising marginal cost of production. Increasing consumer price inflation forces the monetary authority to raise interest rate according to the monetary policy rule and a higher real interest rate depresses world output further.
Under the baseline calibration, the oil supply shock is exogenous to both countries and the technologies are the same, hence the marginal costs of production in both countries are affected in the same way. Since the oil revenue is assumed to be distributed equally among the world consumers, an increase in the price of oil does not create asymmetric wealth effects in the SOE and the ROW. As a result, in case of an exogenous oil supply shock, the responses of both countries are symmetric and the effect on the real exchange rate is negligible.
C. Precautionary Demand Shock
We assume that at time t economic agents learn that there might be an oil supply disruption in the next period (e.g., due to rising concerns about political stability in the OPEC countries or bad weather conditions). Because there is uncertainty about the future oil supply, it is also assumed that the producers in the ROW build up oil stocks in period t by the same amount as the expected oil supply reduction. We further assume that the oil supply shortage if realized will last only one period. Appendix Figure 4 shows the responses of variables when there is an expected oil supply disruption. The dashed lines are the paths of the responses of variables if the expectation is not realized and the solid lines show the paths if the expectation is realized.
As soon as the news about the possible future oil supply shortage arrives at period t , a precautionary demand arises, causing the real oil price to exceed its steady-state level. Output declines in the SOE and in the ROW because some of the oil supply is reserved for the future use in the latter. The increase in the real price of oil pushes CPI both in the SOE and in the ROW above the steady-state level in period t . The real exchange rate appreciates with the news about the possible future oil supply disruption but the effect is very small. This sheds some light on the sharp expectations-driven fluctuations of the price of oil in the global markets. The fears about the future oil supply causes an oil-specific demand shock (contrary to the aggregate demand shocks presented previously) which generates an abrupt endogenous volatility in the oil market, even if the expectations do not come true in the following period. Nevertheless, in period 1  t , the effects changes depending on whether the oil supply shock is realized or not. We now turn to these two cases.
The expectation about the oil supply is not realized
If the expectation is not realized, since the producers deplete their oil stocks, both the oil demand and the real price of oil fall sharply in period 1  t . In period 2  t , all the variables return back to their steady-state levels. In period 1,  t the decline in the real price of oil stimulates output growth, hence, output increases above the steady-state level both in the ROW and in the SOE.
The expectation about the oil supply is realized
If the supply of oil declines in period 1  t as expected, the real oil price returns to the steady-state level since the decline in the oil supply is offset by the decline in the oil demand as firms in the ROW use their oil reserves. CPI inflation in the ROW and in the SOE decrease in period 1  t .
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the origins and macroeconomic consequences of oil price fluctuations using a theoretical framework. Building on the work of Kilian (2009) , real price of oil is endogenously determined in our model. We model a small open economy in order to analyze the effects of the oil price changes caused by the developments in the rest of the world. Modelling the small open economy and the rest of the world together enables us to identify the real exchange rate and the trade channels that transmit the direct and indirect effects of the global shocks to the small open economy. In order to capture the effects of the precautionary oil demand caused by uncertainties about the future oil supply, we add an oil stock variable in the model, which allows firms to build up temporary oil inventories.
Using our model, we focus on the following shocks that lead to higher oil prices: unanticipated productivity and government spending increases, an unexpected oil supply decrease and an expected oil supply disruption which lead to a precautionary oil demand. A key finding is that oil price shocks have significantly divergent impacts on economies depending on the nature of the shocks. It is striking to see that not all aggregate demand shocks produce CPI inflation. Although both productivity and government spending shocks lead to higher oil prices, they have opposite impacts on the firms' marginal costs and hence on CPI inflation.
It is widely known that expectations play an important role in the commodity markets, causing price volatility. We demonstrate that, when firms are allowed to hold oil inventories, expectations on future oil supply changes can create high oil price fluctuations, which cannot be explained by macroeconomic fundamentals.
Our results point out the importance of distinguishing between the causes of oil price increases. In the light of these results, we argue that macroeconomic policies dealing with oil price shocks must carefully consider the underlying causes in the first place. This is a crucial result for the operational conduct of monetary policy in terms of determining an appropriate accompanying path of the policy rate. This is because the dynamic responses of inflation and output gap, these being the variables in the objective function of the monetary authority, are substantially different in terms of both direction and magnitude depending on different oil price shocks. This paper also gives an insight into the discussion regarding the choice of the inflation target. A direct monetary policy response to price of oil is probably not a good idea. The reason for this is twofold. First, by excluding oil prices whose movements show significant short run volatility, policy makers can get a better sense of underlying trends in consumer price inflation. As we illustrate, an expectation of lower oil supply in the future immediately creates an endogenous excess volatility in the global oil market due to the resulting precautionary demand. The second reason is the uncertainties about the origins of the oil price shocks. For example, if the origin of the oil price shock is an increase in the foreign productivity, simply raising interest rate following a policy rule which includes some measure of oil price inflation will contract output and bring future decrease in inflation, causing the economy to move further away from its steady state. Therefore, it is obvious that a stability oriented central bank may not afford to treat oil price shocks as if they take place in isolation.
This framework is indeed able to yield much more than what is presented here. The setting can be extended to perform welfare evaluation. Incorporating wage rigidity, which makes the stabilization objective of the monetary authority more complicated by triggering second round effects, allows for the analysis of optimal policy and normative policy conclusions, on which we are planning to focus next. 
Equations (19) and (20) hold also for the foreign economy with each variable replaced by a corresponding starred variable. Under the assumption of complete international financial markets and no-arbitrage, the following (log-linearized) risk sharing equation can be written:
Aggregating the production function (4) over all firms and log-linearizing to first order yields:
Then, log-linearization of good market equilibrium condition (15) around the symmetric steady state gives:
is the steady-state share of government spending in GDP.
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Equation (24) can be combined with the foreign goods market equilibrium
and equation (22) to yield:
Combining equation (24) with the Euler equation (20) gives (ignoring the constant):
B. Marginal Cost and Inflation Dynamics
Utilizing equations (6), and (7), the (log) real marginal cost in terms of domestic prices t mc , which is identical for each firm, can be derived as (ignoring a constant):
where we make use of equations (19) 
Thus, one can get the flexible price level of output as follows: Keynesian Phillips Curve can be written in terms of output gap as:
Moreover, using the definition of output gap, and equation (26), we can derive the new Keynesian IS curve as:
C. Rest of the World and Oil Market Equilibrium
Using the (log-linearized) cost minimization condition for foreign firms (
and substituting the equilibrium level of employment yields: The foreign economy version of equation (28) is simply:
Using the corresponding equation for 
